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Abstract
A substantial part of the research project "The analysis of multi-
level decisions" will be devoted to delegation within the firm, by coordina-
ting instruments as transfer prices and budgets. To provide for the basic
framework for this research, an integral model of the firm is to be developed,
covering three issues, namely multiple technologies for intermediate and end
products, "make-or-buy" decisíons with respect to technical services, and
common cost allocation due to the presence of general services.
This paper is devoted to the third of these issues. For the allocation
of fixed overhead costs, a mathematical programming approach is proposed: by
the appropriate use of optimal dual variables, the allocation does not distort
the optimal product mix. The method also applies to a decomposable organiza-
tion model.
This research is supported by a grant from the Common Research Pool of the
Tilburg University and the Technical University Eindhoven (Samenwerkingsorgaan
KHT-THE) in the Netherlands.
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1. Introduction
In the accounting líterature, a large number of articles is devoted to
cost allocation problems. Extensive surveys and discussions concerning the
subject can be found in [2] and [14]. As the contributions in the literature
originate from accountants, economists and management scientists, there exists
a great variety in assumptions, definitions, methodologies. This is, of
course, not in favour of a systematic development of concepts and definitions.
The key problem in cost allocation is the occurrence of settings where
a need for allocation arises although the particular cost is non-separable.
Whether to identify this cost as "joint" or "common", is of secondary inter-
est. In recent survey-like work, e.g. [2], [4] and [14], the "decision focus"
is largely recommended, i.e. the analysis of cost allocation from an organi-
zational point of view.
As part of the research project "Analysis of multi-level decisions",
we are building a so-called integral model of the rirm. The incorporation ot
cost allocation issues in this model will turn out to be most desirable.
The paper is organized as follows.
In chapter 2 we present the definitions of joint costs and common costs as
applied in [2]. Chapter 3 treats a rather simple setting where cost allocation
is required. The model and its solution should provide elementary insight in
cost allocation problems. Then, in chapter 4, we will discuss the importance
of the analysis with respect to organizatíonal design. We conclude that chap-
ter with a problem statement that reflects the relationship between multi-
level decisions and joint~common cost allocation. Chapter 5 provides for a
link with earlíer work in the research project; the mathematical programming
approach to be presented, may well be applied to the model of the firm as
developed in [11] and also to decomposable organization models (e.g. [10]).
2. Cost allocation problems
2.1. Cost allocation
A most general indication of what is meant by a cost allocation is
given in the following:
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Definition 1:
A cost allocation is the efficient partitioning of a cost among a set of cost
objects. The term "efficient" expresses that all of the cost is allocated, no
more and no less.
In every cost allocation, three elements play a central role:
1. the total amount of costs to be allocated;
2. the cost objects among which the costs are to be allocated;
3. the allocation method or allocation basis that partitions the total cost.
The nature of the costs may be such that they are not entirely separable over
the cost objects. Then a cost allocation problem arises due to the joint
(common) nature of (part of) the costs.
2.2. Joint costs; common costs
Non-separable costs lead to allocation problems. The literature on
this subject can broadly be divided into two classes, viz. "joint cost alloca-
tion" and "common cost allocation". In order to clarify this distinction, the
terms "joint cost" and "common cost" will be defined.
Definition 2
A~ oint cost is a non-separable cost due to a non-separable production func-
tion which is defined on two or more products. Here the products are the cost
objects.
So joint costs are related to joint production (see [5), chapter 9).
After the split-off point, there exists separately identifiable products,




A common cost is a non-separable cost due to a production function defined on
just one intermediate product or service which is used in two or more di-
visions (or product lines). Here the divisions (or product lines) are the cost
objects.
The divisions could have produced the intermediate product or service
independently, but apparently they have decided to act together. Hence they
jointly incur the costs of their joint action.
The reader may convince himself that these separate definitions do not
always guarantee an unambiguous answer to the question whether some non-separ-
able cost is either a member of the class of joint costs or of the class of
common costs. But they provide some insight ín the nature of non-separable
costs.
2.3. Allocation problems
Because of our research focus (see chapter 4), we will not concentrate
upon the dífferences between joint and common cost settings. What really is
important, is the apparent non-separability of costs, caused by the absence of
properties which enable some natural allocation among cost objects. Lacking
this "natural allocation base", one has to design ("invent") an allocation
rule. It is clear that every allocation rule is subject to a certain degree of
arbitraryness.
Definition 4
A cost allocation problem consists of the design of an allocation rule (al-
location method, allocation base) to be used for the allocation of certain
non-separable (joint, common) costs.
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3. The Louderback-Moriarity approach
From the various streams in the research on cost allocation problems,
we will present one of the most elementary approaches, which is, though not
really complicated, conceptually ínteresting.
3.1. The model
Consider a firm consisting of n divisions each of which has to produce
a certain quantity of a(final) product. We will distinguish among three ways
of producing the n products.
In the first production possibility, the divisions jointly buy an amount of
raw material (costs: J), then extract n intermediate products, to be further
processed by the divisions independently. A division finishing its own product
incurs a cost equal to xi. The total cost of this production possibility is
thus: J f xl -} ... f xn.
Secondly, each division has the opportunity to buy the required quantity of
its final product independently. This would cost: yi, i- 1,...,n.
One could also imagine that the finishing costs xi of some division i are so
low that this division is tempted to buy the same amount of raw material
entirely for ítself, and then extract and finish its product. The cost is then
J f xi (as it is assumed impossible to buy smaller (and hence cheaper) amounts
of the raw material).
It will be assumed that the first option, i.e., jointly buying the raw
material and then further processing by individual divisions, is the cheapest
alternative. Furthermore, every division has potential interest for this
option as for every division the finishing cost is lower than the cost of
buying the final product.
We now give a more formal presentatíon of the model.
Define:
n .- number of divisions;
J.- joint cost incurred if the divisions jointly buy the raw material;
xi :- i-th division's finishing cost, i- 1,...,n;
Yi :- i-th division's cost if it independently buys the required amount of its
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final product, i - 1,...,n;
zi :- the cost of the i-th divisions next best alternative; since a division
might be tempted to buy the raw material independently, it holds that
zi - min{y , Jfx.}, i- 1,...,n.i i
The two assumptions can be stated as follows:
Assumption 1: J-~- xl t... f xn ~ yl }'~~} yn
Assumption 2: for i- 1,...,n, it holds that xi ~ yi.
For the firm as a whole, the alternative where all divisions jointly
use the raw material is the most attractive one. This chapter is devoted to
the design of an allocation rule which stimulates divisions to join in the
common purchase and use of the raw material. Note that in this setting the
common costs arise because of cost savings.
3.2. The allocation method and its properties
The model as described in section 3.1 gives rise to a cost allocation
problem wíth respect to the joint costs for the common raw materials. Bala-
chandran and Ramakrishnan (1] provide for a solution to this problem, mainly
inspired by the contributions of Moriarity [12, 13], and Louderback [9]. The
proposed allocation rule, to be referred to as the Louderback-Moriarity
method, can be stated as follows.
Let:
T.- the total cost to be allocated, i.e., T- J f xl f... f xn;
ti :- the cost allocated to division i, i- 1,...,n.
Now the allocation rule is:
n ptc
i
ti - bi f(T - E bi) n
i-1 E ptc.ii-1
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where the basic charge bi and the ~ropensity to contribute ptci are taken as
follows ( i - 1,...,n):
n
bi - xi (hence T- E bi - J)
i-1
ptci - zi - xi.
Indeed, all of the cost is allocated. Furthermore, this allocation rule has
the five advantages as mentioned by Moriarity in his first article [12]. In
short, these properties are:
1. the comparison of the costs of joint versus independent action is an essen-
tial element in the method (assumption 1);
2. ti ~ zi, so every division is encouraged to participate in the joint use of
the raw material;
3. every cost object has a positive share in the savings of the firm as a
whole;
4. every cost object bears a part of the total costs which is at least as much
as its own costs xi, in other words: no division is subsidized;
5. every division has an incentive to look for cheaper "next-best alterna-
tives" zi as that would reduce its ptc-fraction; the same holds with re-
spect to the division's finishing costs xi: finding cheaper finishing
technologies results in a lower basic charge.
A last important property is that the allocation is in core. (This is proven
in [1], p. 90). The core is a concept from game-theory which guarantees a form
of stability; in effect, the above allocation rule being in core implies that
it is untractable for groups of divisions to form a coalítion in order to buy
the amount of raw material for themselves only, and then further process it.
3.3. Evaluation
Balachandran and Ramakrishnan [1] conclude that the core criterion,
which is a stability concept, generally does not uniquely determine a solution
to the allocation problem. However, the "propensity-to-contribute" concept,
which is responsible for the equity and fairness properties, selects exactly
one allocation rule in the core. So the economic principle of stability to-
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gether with the accounting principles equity and fairness lead to a unique
solution of the allocation problem. The authors of [1] note that the allowance
for coalitions, to be formed by subsets of divisions, is conceptually more
attractive, but wíll cause increased computational difficulties.
What we find interestíng about the propensity-to-contribute concept,
is the observation of having a margin between a division's basic charge and
the cost of its next-best alternative. The fairness property apparently im-
plies the allocation of a fraction of the cost savings which is proportional
to the division's margin zi-bi. Of course, this meaning of fairness is more or
less arbitrary: the division's margin could have been utilized in a different
way.
Although we have first presented the rule and then cited its proper-
ties, it is clear that in the solution of allocation problems, the statement
of a set of desirable properties will be an essential element.
4. Cost allocation and multi-level decisions
In chapter 2 we have discussed terms like joint costs and common
costs. Then we illustrated these concepts with a particular approach from the
literature on cost allocation problems. Now we will discuss the need for a
thorough analysis of cost allocation from an organizational design point of
view. In this light two recent contributions are treated. Finally, we formu-
late the problem in view of the research project "The analysis of multi-level
decisions".
4.1. Motives for the analysis of allocation problems
A firm faces allocation problems whenever joint or common costs are
incurred. Recalling the organizational setting in the Louderback-Moriarity
approach, we observe that common costs often arise because of cost savíngs due
to joint action (instead of independent behaviour of the cost objects). A
second source of joint costs is the occurrence of internal "general services"
like Central Management, Research and Development, Public Relations. These
departments produce common goods from which all other subunits in the firm
benefit, thereby giving lead to common costs to be beared by the firm as a
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whole. Finally, we observe that every allocation of a fixed cost (e.g., fac-
tory overhead, depreciation of machinery) is implicitly a joint cost allo-
cation.
From a global point of view, i.e. if some overall optimization model
for the entire firm is applied, it is often concluded that allocations should
not be taken into account. Discussions and more references on this theoretical
observation can be found in [2, pp. 7-8] and [14, p. 5]. Briefly speaking, the
literature suggests "allocation free" decision models. But, at the same time,
we observe that in any organization of a reasonable size a certain degree of
decentralization has taken place. Decentralized information and delegation of
decision-making authority are the key words in the attempt to reduce the
complexity of decision-making in a large firm (see [8], chapter 14 for an
excellent treatment of these issues). This implies that the use of overall
optimization problems as models for a decentralized firm is highly unrealis-
tic. As a consequence, different type of models, that explicitly recognize the
decentralization features, are required. It is not a-priorily clear whether
these models again turn out to be allocation free.
Summarizing, the theoretical justification for not considering cost allocation
may well be non-valid in more decentralized settings.
The potential theoretical improvements by the explicit recognition of
allocation issues in modelling complex, decentralized organizations can be of
practical significance, as, not only by definition (see chapter 2), common
cost allocations do occur in the context of multi-division firms. The third
and probably most important motive, which is again "decentralization-in-
spired", is that, whenever a process of delegation of decision authority
occurs, the division managers become local decision-makers with their own
responsibilities, goals, preferences. Now a motivation and a coordination
prob? e~-~ arises, as Dopuch et. al [5] , p. 330, note. How can local decision-
makers be lead towards firm-wide optimal decisions? Thomas ([14], pp. 7-8)
provides reasonable arguments why a division manager's decisions might be
affected by allocated costs. As an example, we return to the Louderback-Moria-
rity approach. Property 2. and 3. (see section 3.2) are clearly stimulating
divisions to joint action; property 5. implicitly assumes that the cost allo-
cation has an effect on a division manager's behaviour.
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4.2. Cost allocation in a decentralized organization structure
Altogether, in a multi-division setting, common cost allocation is not
only likely to occur, but will have an effect on decision-making within the
firm. This provides a strong incentive to search for allocation rules which
are consistent with the organizational structure. Therefore, we discuss two
recent contributions in the literature that incorporate organizational con-
siderations.
Zimmerman [15] is, to the author's perception, the first one who
observes that "cost allocations, managerial behaviour, and the structure of
the organization, including the incentives facing the managers, are extricably
linked". In his article, Zimmerman states that in certain situations cost
allocations yield positive net benefits to the firm. This notion is further
explored by indicating the relationship with the agency problem. It is shown
that cost allocations can act as a lump-sum tax which reduces a manager's
l;Vll'l1ILLFJt1V11 Vl peLqlllJ'lte~.
A second component of the analysis refers to allocation rules where
allocated costs are coupled to a division's use of production factors (e.g.
labour). Similar rules, which are sometimes observed in practice, might induce
divisions to switch to labour extensive production technologies, which in turn
can be sub-optimal from a firm-wide point of view.
Contrary to Zimmerman's set up, which is of a more or less verbal,
introductory kind, Cohen and Loeb [3] provide for a conceptual approach to
common cost allocation in a divisionalized firm. They start with the charac-
terization of a pure common good: once produced, it is free for all divisions
to consume. (Example: corporate image advertising.) The opposite of a pure
common good is a pure private good: once consumed by some division, it is not
available to other divisions anymore. (Example: collective typing service
department in a university.) Whereas Hughes and Scheiner [6, p. 90] proved
that there does not exist a full cost allocation scheme for pure private goods
which enhances "efficient decentralization", Cohen and Loeb show "that it is
possible to reach an efficient allocation by decentralization and fully allo-
cating costs". Their organizational model consists of a number of divisions
plus a corporate headquarters. The divisions all require a certain pure common
input, which is to delivered by headquarters. The provision of the common
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input leads to common costs, incurred by headquarters, and to be allocated to
the divisions, which are considered as profit centers. Having incomplete
information with respect to the divisional profit functions, it is difficult
for headquarters to determine the right level of the common input. The alloca-
tions of the common costs should generate information about divisional demand
and thus be helpful in choosing the optimal level of the common input.
It is not appropriate to present the complete model as developed in
[3). The main result is that the divisions are charged according to the mar-
ginal benefits they receive from the common input. This brings about the
"free-rider problem": divisions have an incentive to understate their demands
and still enjoy the benefits of the common good. Of course, this drawback is
intimately related to the asymmetric information structure.
4.3. Contribution to the research project "The analysis of multi-level de-
cisions"
We have described motives for and contributions to the organizational
design approach to cost allocation problems. It is now logical that within the
research project "Analysis of multi-level decisions", with decentralization,
delegation and coordination as main topics, profound attention will be paid to
cost allocation. In effect, we will buíld in this topic in the development of
what is called an "integral model of the firm".
The integral model of the firm should provide for a basic framework
for the analysis of multi-level issues. In previous work we presented a model
for the fírm including multiple technologies for products and "make-or-buy"
decisions concerning technical services. Though we started in a(Leontief)
input-output setting, we ended up with a mixed-integer programming formulation
(cf. [11)). In casual input-output analysis, the (usually fixed) costs of the
general services are allocated among the other sub-units in the firm. As an
extension to the model developed earlier (in [11)), we will assume that,
besides end products, intermediate products and technical services producing
sub-units, the firm also contains a"General Services" sector. The costs
incurred by general services departments may be variable in the long run, but,
in the short run, they are assumed to be entirely fixed.
The problem to be analyzed is then:
"Can cost allocations be used as coordinating instruments that direct the sub-
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units' managers towards the correct, i.e., firm-wide optimal, choices of
technologies and make-or-buy decisions?"
5. Fixed overhead allocation
The first half of thís paper can be seen as an introduction in the
field of joint~common costs. Then, ín chapter 4, we have directed the atten-
tion to the multi-level decision-making aspects of allocation problems. Sec-
tion 4.3 was concluded with a problem statement which asks for the incorpora-
tion of cost allocation issues in the decision model as developed in earlier
work, i.e. [11]. In this chapter we introduce the mathematical programming
approach to common cost allocation. The analysis is rooted in an article by
Kaplan and Thompson ([7], 1971). These authors describe how a fixed overhead
cost can be allocated among activities in the context of a linear programming
model of the firm, without distorting the relative profitability of products.
Rono„o~ .,F tl.o ..,}.l ~ i th t}~o .aoni ci nn .nniiol i n ~ 1 1 i thc nrU nf 1lonl ~n.,...........-,.... v.. ~.... ~....~.-.......~........... ..~~.. ~..~ .,.....~.,~..,. ....,.....~ ~.. i.~~, ~..... ...,...~ .,.. ,....t,~.~..
and Thompson is closely related to our problem statement. Secondly, their
method also applies to decomposable organisation models.
5.1. The basic theorem
Consider the LP-problem:
Maximize p x
st. A1 x ~ al
An x ~ an
x ~ 0
The (finite) optimum solution value P is attained at x- x, so P- px. The
associated dual problem is:
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Minimize ulal ~- ... t unan
s.t. ulAl f... f unAn ~ p
ul,...,un ~ 0
(5.2)
with optimal solution (ul,...,un), so P- ulal f... f unan.
Let ki (i - 1,...,n) such that ki ~-1. We present a"perturbed" version of
(5.1) :
n
Maximize (p -1- E kiuiAi)y
i-1




If we take y- x, then y ís an optimal solution to (5.3).
Secondly, ((lfkl)ul,...,(lfkn)un) is an optimal dual solution.
n
The optimum solution value is P f E ki ui ai.
i-1
(5.3)
The proof of this theorem, which exploits the complementary slack conditions
with respect to the original problem (5.1)-(5.2), is given in appendix A.
Taking kl -... - kn - k, - 1 ~ k~ 0, we obtain the result of Kaplan
and Tl,o~~son ( [7], p. 356). Their version of (5.1) is simply:
Maximize p x
s.t. A x ~ b
x ~ 0
(5.4)
They take k-- H where H is some fixed overhead cost, 0~ H~ P. The solutionp - -
of ~~~C ~,C~ ~u~ ued version of (5.4) , i.e.
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Maximize (p f ku A)x
s.t. A x ~ a
x ~ 0
(5.5)
is again the optimal x of (5.4), with solution value P t kua - P- H. So all
ovc~:.~~,: ~~ allocated without distortion of the optimal product mix.
5.2. Alternative formulation
It is not difficult to state the analogon of theorem 1 which applies




s.t. Ai x~ ai, i- 1,...,n
x ~ 0
Let the finite optimum solution value P be attained at x- x.
Let (ul,...,un) be an optimal dual solution. The perturbed problem:
n
Minimize (c ~- E k, u A)y
i-1 1 i i
s.t. Ai y~ ai, i- 1,...,n
y ~ 0
where ki ~-1 ( i - 1,...,n), has y- x as an optimal solution.
Furthermore, ((lfkl)ul,...,(lfkn)un) is dual optimal.
n




5.3. Application to the integral model of the firm
This result can be very useful for the decision model developed in
[11]. We now highlight two main opportunities.
Firstly, the input-output based model including multiple technologies for
products, appeared to be a(continuous) LP-problem of the form (5.6), say:
Minimize c x
s.t. A x ~ a (5.7)
X i ~
Let x be the optimal solution. Suppose we want to allocate a fixed cost H
among the activities, so among the technologies in the end product and inter-
mediate product sector (for terminology, see [11], chapter 2). Hereto, we
define k:- H~(cx). The following modified LP-problem still has x as an op-
timum solution:
Minimize (c f ku A)x
s.t. A x ~ a
x ~ 0
(5.8)
where u is an optimal dual solution to (5.7). The optimum solution value
is cx t H, so without distortion of the optimal activity mix, the fixed cost
is allocated!
Secondly, Kaplan and Thompson [7] suggest an extension of their method
for the case of a mixed-integer programming formulation. In our previous
report [11], this type of modelling has been chosen to incorporate the "make-
or-buy" issue (viz. by introducing 0-1 variables). We expect to find a modifi-
cation of corollary 1 similar to the just mentioned extensíon in [7].
Summarizing, we have at hand a potentially powerful "tool", i.e.,
corallary 1, for the incorporation of common cost allocation in the earlier
developed model in [11]. The precise mathematical analysis and economic inter-
pretation of the outlined ideas form a topic of further research to be re-
ported on in a future report.
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5.4. Application to decomposable organization models
This section is somewhat independent of the rest of this paper. On the
other hand, it is included in this chapter, as it is concerned with the allo-
cation of a fixed cost in the context of a decomposable model of the firm.
Moreover, the proposed method is a direct application of theorem 1.
The model (cf [10], chapter 2)
Consider the following block-angular, and hence decomposable, LP-
problem as the model of a divisionalized firm:
Maximize clxl f... f cnxn
s.t. Alxl f... f Anxn ~ a
Blxl ~ bl
B x ~ b
n n - n
xl,...,xn ~ 0
(5.")
The blocks Bixi ~ bi represent the local constraints of the i-th division
(i - 1,...,n); the common rows E Aixi ~ ai reflect the common use of certain
scarce resources to be dividend among the divisions by the central unit.
Implementation of optimal plan
Suppose that a planning procedure à la Dantzig-Wolfe or à la Benders
([10], chapter 4) is applied to solve (5.9). In the course of the last itera-
tion of such a procedure, the central unit learns the amounts of scarce re-
sources al,...,an (ai ~ 0, E ai - a) to be allocated to the divisions, plus
the optimal shadow price u0 of these resources. Now the central unit wants to
implement the optimal plan as found in the planning procedure ([10), section
4.1.3, 4.2.3), while allocating a fixed cost H. It is assumed that H~ u a.- 0
Define k :- H~(u0a).
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Theorem 2
Consider the n problems (i - 1,...,n):
Maximize (ci - ku0 Ai)yi
s.t. Ai yi ~ ai
Bi yi ~ bi
yi ~ 0
(5.10)
Let (xl,...,xn) be an optimal solution to the original problem (5.9) with
(finite) objective functionAvalue P. Then yi - xi is optimal to (5.10) with
objective function value ci xi - ku0ai (i - 1,...,n).
The sum of these n optimum solution values is P-H.
The proof of this theorem, which is based on theorem 1 and certain decomposi-
tion features, is given in Appendix B.
Allocation rule
Let each divisíon solve the problem
Minimize (ci-kuOAi)xi
s.t. Ai xi ~ ai




The original "overall" problem (5.9) can be seen as the problem of
finding those activity levels, xl,...,xn that maximize the gross profit of the
firm. This planning problem can be solved by a procedure à la Dantzig-Wolfe or
~ la Benders, thereby taking into account the decentralized information struc-
ture [10, p. 34]. At the end, this yields the optimal amounts of common re-
sources for each division (i.e. al~,,,~an) and also the optimal shadow price
u0 of these resources.
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In order to implement the optimal plan, each division is given in its
part ai of the common resources. Furthermore, the division pays a price for
the actual use (i.e. A,x,) of common resources which is a fraction of thei i
optimal shadow price. This fraction k is k- H~(u~a). The price for common
resources, ku~, has two properties, viz:
1. the final activity levels as computed and implemented by the divisions
still realize the same gross profit (say P);
2. all of the overhead cost H is allocated.
Now 1. and 2. imply that the net profit of the firm is maximized. (It is equal
t o P-H . )
A few important remarks are in order.
The cost H is assumed fixed, and hence independent of the xi, so the divisions
cannot influence the level of H. If H would have been the cost of the general
services department, this means that the divisions cannot influence the effort
level of the general services department. The allocation rule does not provide
some means of evaluation of "General Services".
Tl.., F.. ..t. 1. ..i F.. .1. .i ....] I ..~ mt s
iata. 1a.ta~.a..tVia Lt ij ~1LL11VLÍ11 VvCr U1V1J1V11J aL1U `I.VLlllÍlVl1~ rCJtLil..tttlll.~~l. llllb 1.7
not a necessary condition for the allocation method to succeed. E.g. if the
total valuation of just one of the common resources solely exceeds the over-
head cost, then the overhead can already be covered if divisions are only
charged for the use of that particular common resource.
Finally, recall the assumption H~ u~a. If this condition is not fulfilled,
the proposed allocation rule cannot be directly used.
6. Summary
The main points of this paper are:
1) Joint~common cost allocation problems arise whenever non-separable costs
are incurred to be allocated to products or divisions. Definitions and an
illustration of related concepts are given in chapters 2 and 3, respective-
ly .
2) It is highly desirable to put emphasis on the underlying reasons for cost
allocation, in particular, the link with the organizational structure and
managerial behaviour. As a consequence, cost allocation issues deserve sub-
stantial attention within the "Analysis of multi-level decisions" (ch. 4).
ls
3) As a completion to earlier work concerning the integral model of the firm
[11], we extended the model as developed there with a sector "General
Services". In chapter 5, a promising approach to the allocation of the
fixed costs of general services departments over other sub-units is out-
lined.
4) The mathematical programming approach in chapter 5 also applies to decom-
posable organization models (e.g., [10]).
The ideas as referred to under 3) and 4) will be subject to a thorough mathe-
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Appendix A: Proof of theorem 1
The conjectures to be proven are:
1. y- x is an optimal solution to (5.3), where x is an optimal solution to
(5.1).
2. ((1-Pkl)ul,...,(lfkn)un) is an optimal solution to the dual of (5.3).
n
3. The optimum solution value is P~- E ki ui ai.
i-1
Of course, y is a feasible solution of problem (5.3). We now show that
((lfkl)ul,...,(lfkn)un) is a feasible solution to the dual of (5.3), i.e. to
Minimize vlal -~ ... f vnan
n
s.t. v1A1 - E ... f vnAn ~ p f E ki ui Ai- ~-~
vl,...,vn ~ 0
Substitution of vi - (lfki)ui (i - 1,...,n) yields:
n n n
E(1-~ki)ui Ai - E ui Ai -E E ki ui Ai
i-1 i-1 i-1
n
~ p f E ki ui Ai .
i-1
As ki ~-1, every (lfki)ui is ~ 0.
Secondly, y and ((ltkl)ul,...,(lfkn)un) have the same objective function
value:
n n
(P f lEl ki ui Ai)Y - p x} lEl ki ui Ai Y
n
- P-f E k. u, a.
i-1 i i i
(A.1)
due to the complementary slackness conditions as applied to (5.1)-(5.2).
The dual solution value is:
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n n n
E ( lfki)ui ai - E ui ai f E ki ui ai
i-1 i-1 i-1
n
- P~- E ki ui ai
i-1
(A.2)
So we have shown that y and ((1~-ki)ul,...,(lfkn)un) are primal-dual feasible,
with equal objective function value. But then this pair is primal-dual op-
timal. The optimum solution value follows from (A.1) (or A.2)). Q
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Appendix B: Proof of theorem 2
Let u0 be the optimal shadow price of the scarce resources. In the
Dantzig-Wolfe as well as the Benders' case, it is possible to prove the exist-
ence of ul,...,un such that (u~, ul,...,un) is an optimal solution to the
dual of (5.9). From this observation it is easy to prove that
(u~,...,u~,ul,u2,...,un)
is an optimal solution to the dual of:
Maximize clxl f... f cnxn
s.t. Alxl ~ al
A x ~ an n - n
Blxl ~ bl
B x ~ b
n n - n
xl,...,xn ~ 0
Let xl,...,xn be an optimal solution of problem (B.1).
Now we can apply theorem 1. Introduce scalars ki with ki ~-1, i- 1,...,n.
The following modified version of (B.1), i.e.:
Maximize (cl}k1u0A1)yl } ~~~ } (cn}knunAn)yn
s.t. A1 yl ~ al
An yn ~ an
B1 yl ~ bl
Bn yn ~ bn
yl,...,yn ~ 0
(B-2)
stíll has xl~„ ~~xn as an optimal solution. The optimum solution value is
n n
E c x, ~- E k, u a..
i-1
i i i-1 i 0 i
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Observe that (B.2) is composed of n independent problems of the form:
Maximize (ci t kiu~ Ai)yi
s.t. Ai yi ~ di
Bi yi ~ bi
yi ~ 0
(B.3)
Obviously, xi is an optimal solution to (B.3) with objective function value
cixi f kiu~ai.
If we take all ki --H~(u~a), problem (B.3) is exactly problem (5.10)! The sum
of the n optimum solution values is
n „ n
E cixi - E ku~ai - P-H
i-1 i-1
as al f... t an - a and k- H~(uDa). []
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